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BOOK REVIEWS
Anson's Principles of the English Law of Contract, 22d ed. By A. G.
Guest. London: Oxford University, Press, 1964. Pp. xliv, 635.
$8.00.
This edition of Anson, which has by now become a classic of
English legal literature, follows traditional lines in its conception
and construction. By and large, standard treatises purporting to
deal comprehensively with a branch of the law of England are
directed toward two ends. One end is to provide assistance to busy
practitioners. The other is possibly the more important-to provide
guidance to law students by a systematic, unspecialized treatment
of the field. The table of contents bears witness to the significance
of the latter of these ends in the construction of this book. Assuming the attainability of these ends, the book must be adjudged to
be successful-lucidly written, systematically arranged, it appears
to be an excellently articulated outline of the "English Law of
Contract."' Criticism directed toward errors of omission or misstatements of the law do not invalidate the premise, implying as
they do that the possibility exists that the law can be accurately
stated.2
It is the premise itself, however, which must be called into
question. It is uncertain whether it is ever possible to propound
"the law," and further, whether it is desirable to attempt the effort.
In a letter to the editor of the Yale Law Journal, Professor
Arthur Corbin wrote:
...[P3lease insert the word "Working" before Rules of Contract Law. It was on the Title Page of my original manuscript,
but was deleted without my consent by the Publisher. No doubt,
he thought that a Rule is a Rule is a Rule. Later, the Publisher
added the word "Working" to the Title Page at my request;
and now the Company calls special attention in its advertising
to the fact that my Rules are "Working Rules." The truth is
that all rules of law and human society are no more than tentative working rules, based on human experience, necessarily chang' See Scott, Book Review, 76 L.Q. REv. 450 (1960), where the work is
described as "a statement of the simple principles of the English law
on the
subject."
2 See id. at 451-52, for examples of such criticism.
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ing in form and substance as human experience, varies in the
evolutionary process of life.3
The burden of Professor Corbin's comment is that it is beyond
the realm of feasibility to state fully the condition of the law.4
Hence, Corbin's stress on the provisional nature of any legal principle or rule, together with the concomitant warning to all approaching his books seeking evidence-"all rules of law ..
are no more
'
than tentative working rules."
This solution to the dilemma of the legal treatise-writer is only
hinted at by the English practice of limiting the statement of the
law to that as existing at a fixed date.' Clearly, this practice has
two objectives: first, to warn that there may have been subsequent
developments in the law; and second to prevent the continuing flow
of statutes, citations, and decisions from overwhelming the author.
It is dubious, however, whether this strategem can be truly
successful. If the book is to serve as more than a historical record
of the law, as it was at a point in time, it must be designed to serve
as a guide or tool for the student or practitioner. It thereby acquires
certain responsibilities, which cannot be evaded for long if the book
is to continue to have value. Among these responsibilities are the
discerning and denoting of trends and the identification of patterns
and movements in society which will ultimately effect changes in
the law. Thus a law book must provide something more than a
conveniently formulated statement of law or legal principles. It
must aid in understanding the origin, evolution and scope of these
principles, and it should suggest critiques of the principles, criteria
for evaluation, alternative solutions or approaches, and techniques
for achieving change, when necessary. In sum, it should assist
in equipping the student to "do law," in Judge Friendly's phrase.
Judged from this perspective, Anson on Contracts appears to
provide a liberal education in legal conceptions and reasoning
rather than to furnish a guide to the practice of the profession of
law. If it is to retain any utility, however, it ought surely to reflect
Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74
YALE L.J. 311 n.1 (1964).
'The question whether it is possible to restate the law is another issue
entirely.
'Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin,
supra note 3.
' ANSON, ENGLISH LAW OF CoNTRACTs vi (22d ed. Guest 1964).
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current realities, rather than to depict a somewhat formalistic view
of traditional conceptualism.
In the current edition of Anson, Mr. A. G. Guest, has observed
that: "The changing economic framework, the growth of the
standard form contract, and the complexity of modern commercial
relations call for a new approach to the entire question of the sanctity
of contractual agreements." 7 It is regrettable that Mr. Guest, in
updating the work, stopped where he. did, rather, than adopting "a
new approach" to the difficult task of writing a contracts textbook.
Twenty-eight pages of Anson are devoted to the problems
arising out of "standard form" agreement, as well as "contracts of
adhesion." These terms are treated as synonymous, although they
are distinct, albeit interrelated, concepts.'
The policy underlying the labelling of certain arrangements
as "adhesory" is to introduce a justification for the application of
techniques of judicial control. The paradigm case of an "adhesory"
agreement is the economic giant compelling his dealer, a man of
limited resources, to accept more goods than the dealer can possibly
dispose of.? In situations where economically disparate parties are
involved, the courts have felt that social interest requires that the
stronger party should not flex his muscles too violently at the expense
of the weaker.' ° This is a policy decision of major dimensions. It
is a reflection on a problem which has preoccupied American political
life for generations. In Professor Dawson's words, "In law, as in
politics, the control of economic power has emerged as the central
problem of modern times."' 1
Guest, Book Review, 76 L.Q. REv. 143, 144 (1960).
8Professors Kessler and Llewellyn have pointed out the policy factors
leading to the emergence of standard form contracts: they provide a technique
to control business risks (Kessler, Contracts of Cohesion, 43 CoL. L. REv.
629, 631 (1943)) ; they expedite the administrative details of contract formation in a busy corporation (Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv.
700, 701 (1939)); and they are a "means of excluding or controlling the
irrational fact or in litigation," (Kessler, supra at 632). But they never
treated them as synonymous with 'contracts of adhesion.' Kessler describes
their interrelationship in his conclusion: "standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion." Ibid.
'E.g. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675,
677 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises:
Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957).
" Dazell, Duress by Economic Pressure II, 20 N.C.L. Rlv. 341, 362
(1942).
" Dawson, Economic Duress and Fair Exchange in French and German
Law, 11 TurL. L. REv. 345 (1937). See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pres-
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The problem is not new. As Professor Dalzell has pointed out,
"some economic measures have for centuries been treated in our
courts as requiring restraint."'" The difference today is one of
degree, not kind.
As will be discussed later, England has confronted problems of
a similar nature. One might, therefore, expect a standard treatise
on contracts to develop the nature and extent of the problem in
some detail. The sole reference to this complex problem is the bald
statement that "he [the individual] has no alternative but to accept;
he does not negotiate, but merely adheres. In some respects, therefore, it would be more correct to regard the relationship which
arises not as one of contract at all, but as one of status."' 3 The
desirability or undesirability of this state of affairs is not dealt with.
Further, it is not altogether clear whether Mr. Guest is suggesting
that relief from this situation is to be sought outside contract
doctrine; and if so, what devices are relevant and effective. The
inference that contract theory is inadequate is supported by a reading of the following passage: "Nevertheless the Courts have been
forced to apply to this situation the ordinary principles of the law
of contract which are not entirely capable of providing a just solution for a transaction in which freedom of contract notoriously
exists on one side only." There is no indication as to why this is
so, or what alternatives are available.
Professor Kessler provides an insight into this problem:
But apparently the realization of the deepgoing antinomies
in the structure of our system of contract is too painful an experience to be permitted to rise to the full level of our consciousness. Consequently, courts have made great efforts to protect
the weaker contracting party and still keep "the elementary rules"
of the law of contracts intact. As a result, our common law of
standardized contracts is highly contradictory and confusing,
and the potentialities inherent in the common law system for
coping with contracts of adhesion have not been fully developed. 14
The English courts, compelled to grapple with the problem of
adhesory relationships, have evolved various techniques to safeguard against coercive behavior on the part of economically powersure I, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1942). See also
PROPERTY 77-116 (Harvest Book ed. 1959).
12 Dalzell, supra note 12.
12
ANSON,

'

op. cit. supra note 6, at 141.

See Kessler, supra note 9, at 633.
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ful parties. The best known of these devices is the "fundamental
breach" doctrine. This doctrine was evolved to cover contracts
containing comprehensive exemption clauses, 5 and where performance by the exempted party is defective, or nonexistent. In
practice, the courts ignore the exemption clause, measure performance against promise, and, if satisfied as to its desirability, will
permit rescission, and award damages. 6 The policy underlying the
doctrine is unmistakably one of restricting the acceptable limits
on the use of economic power.
The hard question, the question confronting the courts in every
case, is to determine whether the exercise of economic power in the
suit at bar is or is not permissible. Over a period of time, the
contours of permissible conduct will emerge from such determinations, providing guidelines for conformity. Economic strength is
not coercive per se. There are positive values in large-scale economic
organization, primarily the quantity, quality and variety of products
available in the marketplace. A higher standard of living is the
direct consequence of economic organization on a large scale. Again,
it is undesirable to prevent all parties at all times from driving a
hard bargain. On the other hand, certain practices have traditionally
been regarded as unfair, e.g., fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and
as the ingenuity of the human mind devises further practices, the
law has kept apace-hence the doctrine of fundamental breach.
In England, as in the United States, the judges have addressed
themselves to maintaining an equilibrium in contractual relationships.' 7 Yet the policy underlying equality in bargaining has never
been made explicit. The twentieth century has seen a steady movement in the direction of "the restoration of a rough equality in the
economic and social conflicts, by recognizing group pressure as
"In Yeoman Credit Ltd. v. -Apps, [1962] 2 Q.B. 508, the contract
provided that "No warranty whatsoever is given by the owner as to the
age, state or quality of the goods or as to the fitness for any purpose and
any implied warranties and conditions are hereby expressly excluded." Id.
at 510. The car, "by reason of an accumulation of unapparent defects,
was in an unusable, unroadworthy and unsafe condition . .. ." Id. at 508-09.
The court allowed damages of £100.
" See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental
Breach, 50 VA.L. Rxv. 1178, 1193-99 (1964).
The earliest expression of this attitude in England is Parker v. South
E. Ry., [1877] 2 C.P.D. 416. See also John Lee & Son (Grantham) Ltd. v.
Railway Executive [1949] 2 All E. R. 581. For the United States development, see Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in; Perspective, 45 Micr.
L. REv. 253 at 280-81 (1947).
7
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legitimate,""8 not only by sanctioning collective bargaining 9 but
also by limiting the change of choices open to economic powercenters.20 What societal values ultimately underlie this change of
policy decisions, both in England and the United States? After
all, it is not all that long ago that the courts directed their energies
towards supporting efforts to acquire economic power.21
It has been suggested, with regard to the American experience,
that:
The equality implied in the acceptance of free enterprise is
obviously not equality of business success but rather a practicable equality of opportunity for development of one's economic
capacities. [This in turn] .. . points up the problem [which
is] .. .keeping not the freedom of individual opportunity and the

freedom of association for joint economic endeavour in some
sort of equilibrium, lest the one essential undermine the other.22
The problem confronting the courts in contracts disputes is
not a major social issue on a mass scale, but rather recognizing the
potential for abuse that exists by virtue of "the gap between the
formal equality of parties free to make contracts as they wish, and
the actual inequality and lack of freedom cause by slack differences
23
of economic bargaining power."
In sum, the twentieth century experience in commerce and
politics, economics and diplomacy, call not only for a rethinking of
attitudes towards the concept and scope of contracts, but also towards the writing of works on the subject. Mr. Guest has brought
Azson a long way from the original point of departure. Possibly,
however, a created emphasis on the facts of economic life and their
implications for the law would provide more adequate equipment
I$FRIMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SociETv', 96 (Pelican Books ed.
1964).
'" England: Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31. U.S.A. National
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1964). Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§§
(1964).
0Enga: Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act, 1953,
"
1 & 2 Eliz. II, c. 51. U.S.A.: Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Clayton Act § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1964). Federal Trade Commission Act § 1,38 Stat. 717
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
"1Adair v.United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) ; Coppage v.Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915). See KESSLER & SHARP, CAsES ON CONTRACTS 6-9 (1953).
KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYsTEm

ings Inst. 1954).
2Ibid.

40-41 (Brook-
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for students, who must cope with an increasingly more complex
world when they enter practice.
MICHAEL KATZ
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 19491962. By Martin Anderson. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T.
Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 272. $5.95.
In the fifteen years since the Housing Act of 1949 around $4
billion dollars of federal expenditures have been committed to urban
renewal projects in various United States cities. The Housing Act
of 1965 has recently authorized an additional $2.4 billion for this
purpose. Despite the magnitude of these expenditures and the
passions the program has generated among its supporters and
critics, until now there has never been a thorough evaluation of
the effects of urban renewal. Happily, Anderson's book goes a
long way toward filling this void. In it, the author presents by far
the most complete and detailed set of data available on the extent
and effects of urban renewal through 1962 and subjects these data
to careful scrutiny. He concludes that urban renewal has not yet
done much to accomplish the goal of a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American which the act of 1949
established, and that urban renewal is not likely to do so in the
future. This book has already aroused considerable ire on the
part of supporters of urban renewal and is likely to continue to do
so. In my judgment, however, this is an important book and deserves the careful and impartial consideration of everyone with a
sincere interest in solving urban problems. While dealing with many
technical economic questions, the book is clearly written and demands little background in economics of the reader.
After a brief introductory chapter summarizing his case against
urban renewal, Anderson devotes two chapters to a description of
how urban renewal programs operate and their growth from their
beginnings until 1962. In Chapter 5, the average length of time
for completion of an urban renewal project is estimated at about
twelve years. There follow three chapters on the composition of
new building in renewal areas, the role of the private developer in
urban renewal and his probable gain, and the sources of financing
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of renewal projects. In the last chapter Anderson rightly criticizes
official estimates of $3.65 of private funds for every dollar of government "seed money," and suggests that, even under very optimistic assumptions, not over one dollar of private funds is likely
to come forth for each dollar of governmental funds. The latter
is the case because a substantial fraction of funds for private residential construction are obtained from FHA insured mortgages
purchased by FNMA soon after completion of construction. Even
as late as the end of 1962, over one-quarter of such FNMA purchases were delinquent.
In other chapters the author discusses the prospect for rehabilitation as opposed to demolition, the effect of renewal programs on
the property tax receipts of municipal governments, and the
constitutionality of renewal programs. The last topic will probably
be of special interest to readers of this Review, but in my opinion
it is a relatively minor question in appraising urban renewal programs, and neither Anderson is nor am I especially qualified to
discuss it.
The two most important chapters of the book are chapters 4 and
13. In the former, which deals mainly with the impact of renewal
on the housing stock of the renewal area, Anderson argues that
renewal's major effect has been to reduce the housing opportunities
of the poor. He argues, justifiably I think, that up to March 31,
1961, renewal programs had demolished 126,000 low rent homes, of
which about one-fifth were in standard condition, and replaced
them with 3,000 public housing units and 25,000 privately owned
dwellings. Most of the latter were apartment units, and, in 1962,
for the 8,000 or so FHA-insured units located in renewal areas, the
median monthly rental was $195.
Now supporters of renewal programs usually argue that lowincome households displaced by renewal projects are relocated in
better-quality housing, and official reports typically assert that this
has been the case. Anderson points out, however, that private evaluations of relocation suggest that, along with paying greater rentals
than prior to relocation, a much higher proportion of displaced
households are relocated in substandard housing than official reports
indicate.' Indeed, Anderson is the only writer I am aware of who
'This point is brought out even more strongly in a recent article by
Chester Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families,30 J. Am. INSTITUTE
OF PLANNmS 266 (1964). Hartman's paper also suggests that official reports
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asks the relevant questions about relocation, namely, if good-quality
housing is available at comparable rentals, why were the poorerquality dwellings inhabited in the first place and why must they be
demolished to rehouse their lower-income residents in better dwellings. Anderson is fully correct in implying that there are no satisfactory answers to these questions.
In Chapter 13 Anderson discusses changes in U.S. housing
from 1940 to 1960. He correctly points out that, contrary to statements by proponents of renewal, the quality of the U.S. housing
stock has improved markedly since prior to World War II. While
much of the improvement has been due to new construction, analysis
of the components of housing inventory change from 1950 to 1960
strongly suggests that previously existing units have shared in the
over-all improvement. In this chapter Anderson also demonstrates
that the frequent assertion that the middle income groups are disappearing from U.S. cities is without foundation and that non-white
housing quality also improved greatly during the fifties.
Anderson is certainly correct that the short-run impact of renewal programs as they have operated to date has been to reduce
the housing opportunities of the poor. The long-run effect would
be different, however, if, as some have argued, the relative supply
curve of poor-quality housing were perfectly elastic. Under this
latter assumption the best that could be said of renewal, apart from
any public housing built, would be that it produced no change in
the housing of low-income households. However, I would expect
that, because certain types of structures such as older, multi-family
ones can be converted to poor-quality housing more easily and cheaply than others, renewal would reduce the housing opportunities of
the poor even in the long-run, though by less so than in the short-run.
Despite their adverse effects on low-income families, if too much
poor-quality housing has been produced relative to the low-income
demand for it because of external diseconomies or market imperfections, current renewal programs might still be justifiable on
grounds of economic efficiency. This is an important point and
Anderson fails to consider it. My own work' suggests, though, that
greatly exaggerate the proportion of dwellings substandard prior to renewal.
Id. 'I
at 281.
have recently summarized this in "Slums and Poverty," a paper
presented at the Conference on the Economic Problems of Housing in April,
1965, sponsored by the International Economics Association and to be

published in the conference proceedings.
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slums result mostly from the low-income demand for poor-quality
housing and that there is virtually no evidence for the alternative
hypothesis I have sketched out two sentences earlier. Thus, while
I think Anderson has overlooked two important questions in his
evaluation, I would agree with his conclusions regarding the desirability of continuing renewal programs.
I am also inclined to disagree with Anderson on his analysis of
the relations between renewal programs and the tax receipts of
municipal governments. He emphasizes a point which is generally
overlooked, namely that, because of growth in renewal programs
and the long lag between demolition of old buildings and replacing
them with new ones, the effect of renewal programs so far has
probably been to reduce property tax receipts of cities as a whole.
But, because of the low rate of interest at which municipal governments can borrow resulting from the exemption for federal tax
purposes of interest on municipal bonds, the long delay in and of
itself need not mean that renewal programs increase the tax burden
on the rest of the city. Using Anderson's figures on the Boston
West-End project, including the official estimate of eventual tax
receipts, and an interest rate of 3 per cent per year compounded
continuously, the project costs the city of Boston about $23.5 million.
Of this total about $5.3 million is the city's share of the net project
cost and the remainder the present value of the foregone tax receipts from demolished structures. Even assuming that the last
20 per cent or so of construction is not completed until twelve years
after the start of the project, as Anderson does, the present value
of officially estimated tax receipts from the renewal area was slightly
less than $33 million at the start of the project. Anderson is, of
course, correct that a significant part of the new construction would
have occurred elsewhere in the same city or in other cities and that
official estimates of tax receipts when renewal is completed may be
overly optimistic.
More importantly, however, I would argue that the effect of
renewal ofn local property tax receipts is almost wholly irrelevant in
appraising the program. If renewal is economically inefficient, as
I believe it is, then the tax receipt increase is smaller than it could
have been if the resources used for renewal had been devoted to
more productive uses. If, to the contrary, renewal could be shown
to be economically efficient, then, even if local property tax col-

19651

BOOK REVIEWS

lections were to be reduced by it, incomes would have increased
sufficiently elsewhere in the economy to permit greater total receipts
to cities than prior to renewal. If anything, in this part of his discussion Anderson concedes too much to renewal by implicitly granting that one of its allegedly beneficial effects is relevant for appraising it.
Two major issues, given only peripheral attention in the discussion of tax receipts of local governments, are the effects of renewal upon the values of surrounding properties and upon the level
of expenditures for municipal services. By raising the values of
good-quality dwellings adjacent to the renewal area, the federalcity subsidy to renewal programs may be partly offset. A good argument can be made, I believe, for the proposition that renewal largely
changes the location at which the external effects of slums are felt.
In some renewal areas, of course, certain highly specialized types
of properties, such as that of universities or hospitals, may exist.
Unless the latter is true, or unless renewal reduces the perimeter of
the slum area, the external effects of slums need not be reduced in
the aggregate. 3
With respect to the effects of renewal on municipal expenditures,
such programs probably reduce the proportion of dwellings which
are especially susceptible to fire and hence expenditures for a given
level of fire protection. While expenditures for police, health and
welfare purposes are probably disproportionately high in slum
areas, there is as yet no convincing evidence that these are the
results of housing quality per se rather than some associated factor
such as income of the area's residents or the area's population density.
And, to the extent that renewal merely results in crowding a given
number of low-income families into fewer dwellings, it is by no
means obvious the effects of renewal are to reduce the expenditures
for local governmental services. For these reasons I do not believe
that a more thorough consideration of these omitted aspects should
lead one to modify Anderson's conclusions on the desirability renewal programs.
Lest my remarks in the last few paragraphs mislead, I believe
that Anderson's theoretical and empirical analysis is generally of
high quality and is marred by only a few errors and omissions.
'Cf. Martin J. Bailey, Note on the Economics of Residential Zoning and
Urban Renewal, 35 LAND ECONOMIcs 288 (1959).
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I also find little evidence in the book of a lack of scholarly objectivity
on Anderson's part, as has been charged by some public officials
connected with renewal programs and in some reviews I have seen.
The book's concluding chapter, which contains a point-by-point refutation of the beliefs of supporters of renewal programs, unfortunately lends a specious credence to such charges. I believe, however, that a careful reading of the body of the book is more than
sufficient to dismiss the charge of a lack of objectivity.
Throughout the book Anderson is careful to describe his sources
of data, to point out their limitations for the purpose for which he
wants to use them, and to indicate any manipulations he has performed on them. In most instances where data on a specific point
are lacking and Anderson constructs his own estimate, he is careful
to describe the basis for the estimate and warn the reader that it is
a rough one. Likewise, in many instances where he must estimate
unknown magnitudes, he chooses an estimate which is favorable to
renewal for his evaluation. There are also several instances where,
in analyzing his data, Anderson is careful to point out that unfavorable results to date may reflect the newness of the program and
to note improvements in later over earlier years. In short, I suspect
that those who have charged a lack of objectivity really do so because they do not like Anderson's conclusions. In so readily dismissing his evidence, I suggest that if any lack of objectivity exists,
it is to be found in Anderson's critics.
In collecting, presenting and analyzing the most comprehensive
body of data on urban renewal programs which has yet appeared,
Anderson's book is a highly significant scholarly contribution to the
field of housing and housing policy. His many text tables and the
19 pages of tables in Appendix A should be an excellent source of
data for many years. Even though his conclusions are and will be
unpopular with many scholars and laymen, I find them to be carefully
arrived at and basically sound. Although as I have indicated I do
not wholly agree with Anderson's evaluation of renewal, I completely agree that urban renewal in its present form has little to
recommend it and should be abolished. While all the evidence needed
for a firm evaluation is not yet available, there is a strong presumption that renewal is both wasteful of resources and reduces the
housing opportunities of the poor. I also agree with Anderson,
though he does little to demonstrate this proposition, that the re-
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sponse of the private market to rising income levels has produced
striking improvement in the U.S. housing stock in the recent past,
even that occupied by lower-income and minority groups. It does
not follow, however, that no governmental programs designed to
improve the housing of lower-income households should replace
the present urban renewal program. Measures taken to raise the
incomes of the lowest income groups would, I believe, lead to an
even more rapid relative improvement in U.S. housing quality than
the Census data presented by Anderson indicate in fact took place
from 1940 to 1960.
RICHARD F. MUTH
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

